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## Red Hydrocarbon





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# Red Hydrocarbon













## *Red Hydrocarbon* – is a not-for-profit think tank





*Red Hydrocarbon* is a new and *practical* way to combat climate change.

- Existing approaches are;
- logically flawed,
  - uneconomic,
    - $\succ$  too slow and .....

# In 20 years – They just haven't delivered!



## Red Hydrocarbon









## But first, WHY Red Hydrocarbon?

- > All solutions to Climate Change are very expensive.
  - .... whether achieved by: PV arrays\*, Wind generation, Nuclear (fission or fusion), Geothermal, CCS or any other means
- > Tax payers (and politicians) have showed that they will not pay
- So, investment must come from conventional sources.
- …and each individual *project* must generate a proper return.

# This means that each individual project must be: **INVESTABLE**





## What about the alternatives?

- *The* € costs of *PV* arrays, may be falling fast but still much higher than *HC* energy.
- •A simple calculation shows that **the land utilization for PV** to replace just the current electricity generation in UK would demand:
  - •- 13% of the area currently occupied by ALL UK motorways

\* Land based **wind generation requires even more** land area, is more expensive overall (and wind does not always blow)

\*Off-shore based wind generation requires the same footprint albeit in the sea but is much more expensive again







## The size of the task:

- The world's current power sector alone) comprises c. 10,000 major power plants ( and in the process, these emit just c.17% of world CO<sub>2</sub> emissions).
- To modify or replace these @ €2 4bn each = c.€30tn
- And this does not even address:
  - > The projected growth in the energy market.
  - > Nor the current **+ 83% non electric energy demand**.

## Summarizing this as a cartoon.....



## Red Hydrocarbon









#### CO2 sources – control options? BUT SHOULD CONTROL BE HERE? 12 100 2 LUMBER NATUAL GAS OIL COAL Hydrocarbons (HCs) CONTROL IS CURRENTLY HERE SHIPPING ELECTRICAL AIRCRAFT CHEMICALS & IRON & STEEL MOTOR REFINERIES POWER TRAFFIC PLUS SPACE HEATING $CO_2$ 20.6 MANY MORE **CO2 FROM ENERGY DERIVED FROM HYDROCARBONS**





## WHY Red Hydrocarbon?

Over the past 20 years, the complexity of trying to:

## identify,

- measure and
  - directly manage;

CO2 emissions worldwide has so far defeated us.

# We need to pull a different and more controllable leaver.



As we all know, amount of carbon (carbon atoms) in anthropogenic CO2 is exactly the same as the number of carbon atom in the HC burned to produce it.

*Direct control of HC production* is less complicated than trying to control CO<sub>2</sub> emission

There are fewer entities to be managed and better, more reliable & available data. So,....

*The Red Hydrocarbon* process is based on using *HC production* as the lever of CONTROL.







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## **CRITICAL AIMS of RED HYDROCARBON**

- Reduce world CO2 emissions to *zero/tolerable*
- Within an *acceptable time* frame 2.
  - On a practical, *long term & sust*ainable basis
- Relying Commercially available capital investment
- 5. In a *market driver* stem, independent of the public purse
  6. *Absent* competitive/discrimentatory, taxes and
- public subsidies
- Delivering *energy prices that people can accept*





### METHODOLOGY

*Red Hydrocarbon* removes all meddling with the markets, so:

- No taxes, no subsidies.
- > The best energy solutions win.
- $\succ$  CO<sub>2</sub> decline is assured.
- Climate change doesn't happen.
- The most cost effective energy sources to meet the demand govern the price
- ➢ Governments of whatever hue are off the pitch.
- > Capital is made available on a strictly commercial basis and
- The existing owners of capital can deploy it without constraint to produce profitable *Cfree* energy.

### SO HOW TO GO ABOUT IT >>>>







## TWO UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES

1. Create a *Dual Market Scheme* for all hydrocarbons (*HC*) where:

Each *HC* market is characterised by the *END-USE* of *HC*.

I - Black HC :where its end use gives rise to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions

## and

2 - Red HC :where its end use does not – it has to be carbon free ("Cfree")





TWO PRINCIPLES UNDERLIE Red Hydrocarbon

2. The *Black HC* market is gradually capped

This is done progressively over (c. 50 – 100 years) voluntarily or by edict, to *exactly* mirror the *Tolerable Carbon Trajectory* (TCT) envisaged by the IPCC.

The IPCC required carbon trajectory is therefore always achieved.

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## Red Hydrocarbon







## HOW DOES *Red Hydrocarbon* WORK?

The basic mechanism is straightforward:

- The two HC markets work independently of each other as separate free markets *supply vs. demand*.
- They *interact commercially* with each other through their *downstream* markets; energy market, the steel market, the fertilizer market.....etc.



## Red Hydrocarbon



#### THE OUTCOME

- > CO2 emissions reduced to a *planned and predictable decline trajectory*.
- > The *traded volume* of *Black HC* trends down but its scarcity drives *market* price up.
- > The *traded volume* of *Red HC* trends up as market demand increases.
- > All *HC produced* is available to serve both *Black* and *Red* market demand.
- > The total volume of *HC* produced/traded depends on this *overall demand*
- > Black & Red HC energy, compete ensuring price comparability.
- > *Red HC* market price will always therefore be lower than for *Black HC*
- Subsidies and special tax regimes no longer apply to either the *HC* or *energy* markets.

#### AND:

- > The markets alone rule the prices for *Black* & *Red HC and* for *energy*
- Governments are not involved in pricing *HC* or *energy*.
- > All types of **Cfree energy (**including **Red HC)** compete with one another.
- So, all types of **Cfree energy** (including **Red HC energy)** become **investible**.
- Commercial/ private investment alone support investment without state aid.
- HC industries mobilize their human and financial resources to become important investors in Red HC energy (R&D, design and build).

### TO ACHIEVE THIS WE NEED A MECHANISM >>>





## THE RED HYDROCARBON - MECHANISM

The *Red Hydrocarbon mechanism described so far* is straightforward.

## However, there are some important KEY aspects:

- 1. THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM
- 2. INVESTMENT and INVESTABILITY
- 3. **RIGHTS to PRODUCE/IMPORT Black HC**
- 4. CERTIFICATES OF END USE & ACCREDITATION
- 5. START-UP ZONAL SCHEMES
- 6. DISPLACEMENT SCHEMES
- 7. **OVERALL OUTCOME**

and

8. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DISAPPOINTMENT-Past problem at:



Red Hydrocarbon is set out in more detail in a foundation paper available

www.redhydrocarbon.com

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## THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM

- **PREVENTING climate change** is a very large endeavour no matter which way it is ultimately achieved.
- SOLVING this problem is possibly the largest and most concentrated non-military enterprise that the world has ever faced.
- ACCOMPLISHMENT of this, has be in a relatively short time (50 100) yrs.

## This is a €50tn. > €150tn. endeavour

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## THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM

The price of HC and therefor the price of HC energy affects the entire world,

...so, in exactly the same way that the oil price shocks of the '70s were absorbed.

A new *world price* for *HC* can be *quickly absorbed* across the world economy.







## INVESTABILITY

Any real solution to climate change has to be conventionally

## **INVESTABLE**:

- It cannot rely on long-term subsidies
  - It cannot rely on discretionary taxation
  - It cannot rely on impositions at the whim of governments.

So, the costs of de-carbonization **MUST** be included in the *price of energy*.





Red Hydrocarbon IN A NUT-SHELL:

The world needs long-term *investors* in Cfree energy.

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With a new and better shape to the HC market, there can be one investor waiting in the wings

### The HC industry.













## **INVESTABILITY**

- The stability of the world economy depends on the continuing industrial health of its *major industries*.
- None is larger nor more important than the *HC industry*.
- So, the health of the world economy currently, depends upon a thriving *HC industry*.
- *HC industry* can only survive through a continuing market for *HC*.







## INVESTABILITY

So, it is in the long-term interests of :

> the world

.....and the HC industry

.....for the *HC* industries to be amongst the principal investors in economically viable *Cfree <u>HC</u> energy*  Site Navigation



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### **INVESTABILITY**

From this premise, a symbiotic cycle emerges as the world approaches the Post Carbon Age



Much more detail and interactive opportunity is available at: www.redhydrocarbon.com



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## Red Hydrocarbon



#### This **INVESTABILITY** cycle drives the program: 40.001) Co2 Emission Potential 35.00 bTe/an 30.00 2) Black HC MARKET (CO2 Allowed ) bTe/an 25.005) Red HC MARKET 20.00 GROWTH bTe/an 15.00 4) RENUABLES MARKET GROWTH -10.00 bTe/an 5.00 Built from a simple economic model 0.00 The Black HC decline curve is the driver. 20 The Cfree curves are the consequences

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## **RIGHTS to PRODUCE/IMPORT Black HC**

*Annual rights/quotas* hold the *key* to the whole *Red Hydrocarbon* approach.



Annual *rights/quotas* to produce<sup>1</sup> *Black HC*, expire at every year-end, It's - "use it or loose it".

 1.- or import if dealing in a a distinct economic block.
 (this will be covered later)





## **RIGHTS to PRODUCE/IMPORT Black HC - summary**

*Annual quotas* to produce/import *Black HC* within the *tolerable carbon target* (TCT), are *auctioned* to *HC* producers or traders.

*Annual quotas* to produce/import can be purchased (or optioned):

- ➢ for any *specific year* (up to 20 years ahead)
- in *defined usage categories* (prioritised by absence of alternatives at future dates along the TCT) and....
- maybe partitioned and re-sold any time during their currency through secondary markets to to *HC* producers or to traders/resellers.



A cartoon shows how it works:







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#### **RIGHTS to PRODUCE/IMPORT Black HC** 2020 > 2030 > 2040 > 2050 >> Auction of annual 40.00 quotas 20.00 0.00 2020 2033 2046 2046 2059 Subsequently, Quotas maybe partitioned Quota Traders **HC** Producers and re-sold through secondary markets to Quotas to *HC* producers or to for sale traders/resellers of HC





**RIGHTS to PRODUCE/IMPORT Black HC - summary** 

*Physical HC* can only be **eligible for sale** on the *Black HC* market from a *supplier* (producer or trader) holding an appropriate residual *annual quota*.

This being the current Annual quota purchased less any ACTUAL Black HC previously sold under that quota in that year.








# **RIGHTS to PRODUCE/IMPORT Black HC**

*End Users of HC* may then fuel their business intentions, by purchase of *Black HC* on the *Black HC* market from a producer or trader *within the level of these quotas*.

The OVERALL *annual volume* of RIGHTS to produce or import *Black HC* is defined by the *Tolerable Carbon Trajectory* (*TCT*) but:

> Who initially owns these rights prior to first sale?

- > Who auctions them?
  - > Who receives the money?

> To what purpose should the money be put?







# **RIGHTS to PRODUCE/IMPORT Black HC**

End Users of HC then fueltheir business intentions, by purchase of Black HC on the lock HC market from a produce er within

is where the guestion, where the money is. Id it be used financino marcino more provi The annuf HC is define prior to first sale?'s. > Who initially > Who auctions them?

- - > Who receives the money?

> To what purpose should the money be put?





So whereas purchasing *Black HC* is constrained by quota and scarcity, ......the purchasing of *Red HC* is another key aspect of *Red Hydrocarbon* 

To be able to purchase **Red HC**, the **last purchaser** in the chain **must be an accredited Cfree consumer.** 





#### Important questions are:



Who **can** purchase *HC* on the *Red HC* market?

- An *accredited Cfree* user (e.g. a CCS electricity plant or a paint manufacturer).

Who **cannot** do so because it or its customers will burn the *HC* and emit Co2?

- A "*Free Burn*" electricity plant, or refinery supplying an airline, or fertilizer manufacturer .....

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- An accredited middle man can purchase *Red HC* if he gives an *undertaking* to sell it (in smaller parcels?) exclusively to accredited *Cfree* users or other accredited middle men and so on.....
- At each transaction the purchaser provides the supplier with a *certificate of end use* showing it to be *Cfree*.

The last purchaser in the chain must be an accredited *Cfree consumer.* 





- Once purchased as *Red HC* with the cost benefits arising from the lower priced *Red HC* market, it can not be made available to a *Black HC* end user he can not make it available to a *Black HC* end user
- ≻ If sold to a middleman
- This naturally gives rise to the notion of an *accredited Cfree* plant/user. This is KEY
- It begets the need for an *agency* to confer the accreditation which would be a natural role for existing *certifying authorities* (Lloyds DnV, ABS...etc.)





# PROGRAM START-UP ZONAL SCHEMES

- An entire "world-scale" *Red Hydrocarbon*"scheme will not be realised immediately.
- ➢ In the short term, a large economic block could lead.
- Any economic block could be the "first mover"
- This would not disturb its own *internal* cohesion ( it could be an ideal policy for adoption by the EU or the US).

(In this case, the importation of *HC* or of products with an *HC* "component" would become part of the process.)

A large economic block becoming "first mover" would encourage others to adopt *Red Hydrocarbon* 





# PROGRAM START-UP ZONAL SCHEMES

- Countries or whole economic blocks at differing stages of development could over time confidently adopt the *Red Hydrocarbon scheme*,
- Each on terms satisfactory to them, as they feel able to do so with rules, decline rates and other parameters suitable to their own circumstances.

# These would be harmonized over time and eventually meet the ultimate IPCC trajectory.

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# Red Hydrocarbon





# **DISPLACEMENT SCHEMES**

# Today, all *HC* users buy from the same market. Today, there is no *Red HC*







# **DISPLACEMENT SCHEMES**

This changes with the introduction of: *Red Hydrocarbon* selling to *accredited* end users.

...but *Red Hydrocarbon* also presents another opportunity: Displacement Schemes....



#### POWER PLANT INVESTS





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# **DISPLACEMENT SCHEMES**

# Displacement Scheme - Type 1:

*Red HC* can be supplied to a non-accredited end user who continues to emit Co2 ("*free burn*") such as an airline.

The "airline" invests (capex+opex) in a  $3^{rd}$  party facility to remove equivalent CO<sub>2</sub>.





The  $3^{rd}$  party facility physically removes or sequesters the CO<sub>2</sub> but can't itself purchase *Red HC* 

The airline can buy *Red HC* and this could be marketed as *Red Aero* with marketing gains and cheaper feedstock for its airline operation





# **DISPLACEMENT SCHEMES**

# Displacement Scheme Type2:

Similar to existing green energy schemes. Here, a motor fuel retailer could sell *Red petrol* or a gas supplier could sell *Red gas* at a premium price to domestic customers. The premium could finance the *Cfree* remova process investment at 3<sup>rd</sup> party facility.

The actual capture plant;

- ➢ will not be able to buy *Red HC* to fuel its own operation
- > its own output will not be classed a *Red HC*.
- > The electricity generated will be less competitive.

The total  $CO_2$  captured is only 50% of the total burned in both operations.

#### DS2. DOWNSTREAM FUEL RETAILER INVESTS





# Red Hydrocarbon





# In overall terms Red Hydrocarbon still works:





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#### THE OVERALL OUTCOME - SUMMARY

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The Red Hydrocarbon story is set out in more detail in the foundation paper available at <u>www.redhydrocarbon.com</u> where everybody can interact with other followers of the site posting comments, suggestions and opinions.

### END OF MAIN SEQUENCE

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# A BRIEF HISTORY OF DISAPPOINTMENT

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#### WHY HAVE EXISTING POLICIES REFUSED TO WORK?

Trying to meet our CRITICAL AIMS  $\blacktriangle$  by *directly regulating* CO<sub>2</sub> emissions across the WORLD hasn't worked and it will not work.









Cat. B methods singlehanded have yet to promoted a <u>celle Cfree</u> <u>investment</u>.

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#### What we have tried so far – Cat. A:

For political/customer/consumer acceptance reasons, the baseline adopted for subsidised energy price competition has been as close as possible to the *current cost of "free burn" HC*.

**Direct price and/or capital subsidies** have been the only methods so far that have achieved any investment – but at a large public cost.

.....but *"free burn" HC* at any appreciable scale is doomed to eventual extinction within <100 yrs.

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What we have tried so far – **Cat. A**:

So, if we continue on this basis, we will be left with the *frightful result of* low energy cost/price across the board

- subsidised on the basis of comparison with a non-existent historic competitor





#### What we have tried so far – Cat. B:

- Carbon taxes & ETS schemes, BOTH impose huge costs upon participating economies.
- > Both are attached **at the whim of governments**,
- This economic "hit" occurs many (c.10) years before the very first reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> could be expected from *any* resulting investment into *Cfree* competition.

ETS schemes are in addition, logically flawed. They can't work for a number of other fundamental reasons:
 the market is flawed &
 the market is flooded





What we have tried so far – Cat. B:

Locally imposed carbon taxes & ETS schemes interfere with the normal working of the energy markets
 This deters the vital ingredient - - - investor engagement
 This in turn, destroys ----- INVESTABILITY

So far, neither Carbon taxes nor ETS has single-handedly promoted a <u>single Cfree investment - WHY?...</u>.





1: Applying to both Carbon tax & ETS

By penalising *HC energy price* either through a carbon tax or ETS being applied to *HC energy* the competitive imbalance with *Cfree* energy can be removed and in certain circulations could provoke INVESTMENT - *BUT only:* 

- in certain circle sances could provoke INVESTMENT BUT only:
   If the spon price of the energy (post-tax / post ETS permit levied), rises to price of isree energy the price tipping point
  - If the price tipping point is somehow gharing teed to be maintained at that level until the investment has matured and that level until the investment has matured and the stable
  - If the selling price of *HC energy* is NOT based on governments controlling the volume of printed emission *permission instruments* (e.g. EUAs) entering the market.





# THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE – Past problems

1: Applying to both Carbon tax & ETS

In both cases, the WORLD would also be paying the price in energy bills as soon as the *tipping point price* has been reached i.e. before any investment is operational or environmental benefit is achieved. This would be approximately:

Some 10 years before the first emission reduction investment triggered by this policy is on stream

and

 35 – 100 years before all emission reduction investment triggered by this policy is on stream

# It is "pay first – collect later" – MUCH LATER





# 1: Applying to both Carbon tax & ETS

Both *Carbon tax & ETS* would be very inefficient economic undertakings.

The economic cost over time (NPV<sub>10</sub>) to the public purse of either scheme is **c. 20 times** the cost of subsidising individual investments as they happen.

It is very much more economically effective, to attract commercial capital to invest in *Cfree* energy directly in lock-step with the *capital and production spend* with no cost to the public purse.

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# 2: Applying to just Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS)

- In a proper or rket (e.g. potatoes or grain) the market price is determed by tension between supply and demand.
- So if potatoes are in short supply the market price goes up and this moderates demand to that the price falls again until there is equilibrium.

# Simple!







2: Applying to just Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS)

Looking at the EUA supply side:

In this *carbon emissions <u>permissions</u> market (EUAs)*.

EUAs are in effect just tokens or currencies (and share some of the characteristics of currencies such as speculation and inflation/deflation).

The number of *EUAs* available for sale is a result of government's policies.





2: Applying to just Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS)

## .....on this EUA supply side:

If governments allow the supply of *EUA*s to be generous, their price will be low and there is *no incentive* for *Cfree* investment.

If governments restrict the availability of *EUA*s then the price will rise to the level, the tipping point, which incentivizes investment in *Cfree* energy.

# Success! .....?





2: Applying to just Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS)

# Not really!!

Look again at the EUA demand side.

Each successful investment in replacement of HC energy with *Cfree* energy **reduces** demand for *EUA*s.

This propels the price **lower**.

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2: Applying to just Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS)

# This is in the wrong direction!

- > The incentive **declines** with each success.
- Investment potential for *Cfree* energy **dies** with every success.

ETS/ EUA or any Carbon Emissions Permissions (CEP) market is a dysfunctional market – it cannot work!



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#### **THE RED HYDROCARBON -** CONNETIONS А **Critical Aims MECHANISM** B20 **KEY FACTORS** С END Red Hydrocarbon is set out in more detail in a foundation THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM paper available at: www.redhydrocarbon.com **INVESTMENT & INVESTABILIITY RIGHTS TO PRODUCE & IMPORT Black HC** 3 **CERTIFICATES of END USE & ACCREDITATION** 4 5 **PROG START-UP& ZONAL SCHEMES** 6 **DISPLACEMENT SCHEMES** 7 **OVERALL OUTCOME** 8 A BRIEF HISTORY OF DISAPPOINTMENT